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WHETHER LARSEN'S INJURY AROSE OUT OF IMMUNE CONDUCT IS A 
QUESTION OF FACT, NOT RESOLVABLE ON A PRE-DISCOVERY 12(b)(6) 
MOTION. 
The District focuses its entire opposition on the sexual component of Larsen's 
complex relationship with Altice, interprets that sexual component as irrefutable assault 
e and battery, then alleges that all of Larsen's harm arose from assault and battery, thereby 
making the government immune. This limited analysis ignores the law, including recent 
clarifying case law, and ignores the specific facts of this case as properly pled in Larsen's 
Complaint. 
A. Under the New Standard Given in Barneck v. Utah Dept. O[Transp., a 
Determination of Whether Larsen's Injury "Arises out Of' Immune 
Government Conduct Is a Question of Fact That Should Be Left to a Jury. 
The Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) provides immunity for the District if an 
"injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" assault and battery. Utah Code 
Ann. § 630-7-301 ( S)(b) (2008). Given the Utah Supreme Court's recent ruling in 
Barneck v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., the question of whether an injury "arises out of' 
immune conduct is a question of fact that needs to be answered by a jury. 2015 UT 50, ~ 
57, 353 P.3d 140 (reversing summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the 
government because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether immune 
conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs' harm.) 
The District claims that Utah's use of the word "injury" instead of "claim" in the 
GIA makes Utah's statute unique from the Federal Tort Claims Act and other 
jurisdictions, such as Idaho and Hawaii, which patterned their immunity statutes on the 
federal act, and which have allowed claims to proceed even where the assault and battery 
exception of an immunity act were implicated. Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P .2d 123 8, 1244-45 
I 
(Idaho 1986); Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dept. of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 579 (Hawaii 2002). 
Yet, omitted by the District is the fact that Utah's GIA was also "patterned after the 
Federal Tort Claims Act," Carroll v. State By & Through Rd. Comm'n, 496 P.2d 888, 891 
(Utah 1972). Consistently, Utah courts also look to federal courts to help interpret the 
Act's various provisions. In fact, in Wagner v. State, when defining the term "battery" in 
the very section of the GIA at issue in the present case, the Utah Supreme Court looked to 
the federal act and its surrounding case law, referring to the "federal courts' analysis of 
the parallel provision in the federal immunity statute." Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, 1 
38, 122 P.3d 599 (emphasis added). 
Further, the words "injury" and "claim" have been used synonymously in Utah and 
other jurisdictions when addressing the GIA. See, e.g. Led/ors v. Emery County School. 
Dist, 849 P.2d 1162, 1165-66 (Utah 1993) ("[P]laintiffs negligence claim arises out of 
battery and false imprisonment and is therefore not the sort of claim for which immunity 
has been waived") (emphasis added) (citing Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1987).) 
The District also asserts that because the factually similar Idaho case cited by 
Larsen, Doe v. Durtschi, was decided before Led/ors, the Led/ors decision would have 
referenced and relied on Durtschi if the law in Idaho were similar to the law in Utah. 
There are two principal flaws with this argument. First, the two cases were factually 
different, with the Durtschi case involving a teacher who sexually molested multiple 
fourth graders, Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d at 1241, and Led/ors involving a student who 
was beaten and injured by fellow students. Led/ors, 849 P.2d at 1163. Second, Led/ors 
was decided pre-Barneck, and was determined under a "but-for" analysis. It was not until 
Barneck that Utah finally adopted the proximate cause analysis-the same analysis that 
2 
was used in the Idaho and Hawaii cases. Accordingly, while cases from thes~ 
jurisdictions which have followed this proximate cause analysis for years may not have 
Ci> been applicable in Utah GIA cases prior to Barneck, they are certainly applicable now. 
The District further claims that Larsen is attempting to "evade the statutory 
categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury." Taylor v. Ogden City 
i> Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 164 (Utah 1996). In Taylor (which was a summary judgment 
case, not a l 2(b )( 6) case), and other cases where the Utah Supreme Court has made this 
criticism, the plaintiffs always acknowledged that assault and battery had directly resulted 
in injury, but they had pied government negligence separate from that assault and battery. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that regardless of what the government allegedly did or 
did not do, it was the undisputed "assailants' violence" that made the government immune 
in those cases. Id. at 163-64. Here, not only has Larsen not pied that an assailant's 
violence caused his harm, but there are no facts that can be gleaned from the Complaint 
that would allow a court to find, without any discovery, that any assault and battery 
occurred at all. In actuality, it is the District that has recharacterized the cause of Larsen's 
injury by inferring facts not in evidence and misconstruing the law on what constitutes 
assault and battery in a civil case. See also Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist., 2012 
UT 31, ,I,I59-60, 285 P.3d 1142 (Lee, J., dissenting in part) (noting that older cases 
criticizing attempts to evade governmental immunity through pleadings that avoided 
mention of undisputed assault and battery "cannot properly be read to foreclose an 
evaluation of the legal cause of injury.") 
Accordingly, under the proximate cause standard adopted in Barneck, Larsen's 
claims should not have been dismissed by the trial court, but should have been allowed to 
proceed to discovery. 
3 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Properly Apply the Barneck Standard on 
Proximate Cause and Improperly Assumed Facts In Its Analysis. 
The District cannot dispute that the trial court applied the outdated but-for test in 
its ruling, relying on pre-Barneck GIA cases. (R. 142-143, 147). The District attempts to 
defend the court's use of that overturned standard by claiming that because those prior 
cases arguably would have come out the same under Barneck, the trial court was correct 
to use the same standard that was applied in those earlier cases to dismiss Larsen's claims. 
There are two major weaknesses to this argument. First, as stated in the holding of 
Barneck, the presence of immune conduct in the underlying facts of a case no longer 
automatically makes the government immune from suit. Instead, courts must examine, on 
a case-by-case basis, what proximately caused a plaintiffs injury. Barne ck, ,I 44. The 
statement in Barneck that prior cases "arguably would have come out the same way" 
made reference to undisputed facts in those cases that left little room for interpretation as 
to what proximately caused the plaintiffs harm. Id. at ,r,r 45-48. Yet by stating that those 
cases "arguably would have come out the same way," the Utah Supreme Court 
demonstrated that it was not completely confident, even acknowledging in the Hoyer v. 
State case that further facts would have to be developed before a determination could be 
made. Id. at~ 48 (citing Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, ~~ 2-3, 24, 32, 212 P.3d 547). 
The most logical takeaway from Barneck is that going forward, there must be, at 
the very least, facts on record by which a court can make a determination as to what 
proximately caused a plaintiffs injury. In most cases, this will require a fact-finder to 
make the ultimate determination, although in some rare circumstances, where there are 
undisputed facts, a court may be able to determine on summary judgment, post-discovery, 
4 
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that immune conduct proximately caused the harm. 1 Under no circumstances, however, 
should a trial court be able to make a ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the proximate 
Gi cause of a plaintiffs harm was an assault and battery which does not even appear in the 
Complaint. 
The second problem with the District's argument is that like the trial court's 
(j) analysis, it assumes key facts not in evidence. For instance, it assumes that the sexual 
intercourse between Altice and Larsen was the source of all of Larsen's harm. It also 
assumes that the district's negligence preceded the sexual intercourse. 
The District's assumptions are inaccurate. There is no one-to-one correlation 
between the sexual intercourse and Larsen's harm. For example, Larsen did not receive a 
sexually-transmitted disease or any physical impairment as a result of sexual intercourse. 
Instead, his harm was derived from trauma associated with embarrassment, ostracization, 
and ridicule, that flowed from a multitude of factors related to his relationship with 
Altice. Moreover, the District's negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent 
supervision, were not a collective one-time action that preceded the sexual intercourse. 
Instead, the district's negligence was ongoing. The District had numerous opportunities to 
prevent misconduct between Altice and her students, both prior to Altice engaging with 
Larsen, as well as during the course of the relationship with Larsen. If there had simply 
been one act of sexual intercourse between Larsen and Altice, with no publication, the 
harm to Larsen may have been nonexistent. The District's negligent retention made the 
problem worse, however, by allowing an ongoing series of interactions, both sexual and 
non-sexual, between Larsen and Altice. 
1 There are no such undisputed facts here at the Rule 12(b )( 6) stage, where even 
the District's argument demonstrates disputed facts regarding whether the District's 
negligence preceded, succeeded, or superseded Altice's interactions with Larsen. 
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And while the sexual component of the relationship did contribute indirectly to the 
overall harm suffered by Larsen, the fact that sex was a part of it cannot in itself defeat 
the entire claim. To hold otherwise would be to cut off a great many additional causes of 
action not listed as immune conduct under the GIA. 
For example, if a government employee negligently runs over a pedestrian, then 
proceeds to intentionally hit that pedestrian with her fist for getting in the employee's 
way, there would be a portion of harm caused by the negligence and a portion of harm 
caused by the intentional battery. The government would not be deemed immune simply 
because the plaintiff pied that a portion of his harm arose from the government employee 
hitting the pedestrian with her fist. 
Here too, even if it were assumed that the sex between Larsen and Altice 
constituted assault and battery (which Larsen disputes), the result cannot be that Larsen's 
entire case is dismissed. Instead, at the most, a jury would have to determine what portion 
of Larsen's harm arose out of allegedly immune conduct (i.e. sexual intercourse between 
Larsen and Altice) vs. the undisputed non-immune conduct (i.e. the remainder of the 
harmful relationship as allowed by the District's negligence and causing Larsen to incur 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in counseling). But to categorically state that because 
Altice and Larsen had sex, all of Larsen's harm must have arisen from the immune torts 
of assault and battery is clearly unsupportable. 
The District cites to several cases where courts determined that assault and battery 
were the cause of a plaintiffs injuries even when the plaintiff attempted to plead separate 
negligence against the district-Led/ors, 849 P.2d at 1166 Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163, and 
S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Utah 1993). All of those cases are easily 
distinguishable. First and foremost, all three cases were summary judgment decisions and 
6 
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involved undisputed facts as to what actually caused the injury or harm, ( as well as 
undisputed facts demonstrating that the alleged governmental negligence preceded assault 
(I) and battery). For instance, in Led/ors, there was no dispute that students had assaulted the 
plaintiff requiring him to be hospitalized. The injuries directly stemming from the assault 
caused the plaintiffs harm, and the alleged governmental negligence preceded it. In 
Taylor, there was no dispute that an unwanted contact caused the plaintiffs hand to go 
through a window, causing direct physical damage to the hand, with the government's 
negligence in failing to maintain a safe window preceded the injury. In S.H, there was no 
dispute that the cab driver sexually assaulted a young deaf student, with the resulting 
harm being directly connected to the sexual assault, and the government negligence in 
hiring the cab company preceding the one-time injurious act. 
In Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist., Justice Lee further distinguished these 
cases as part of a dissent that advocated the as-of-then unadopted proximate cause 
analysis that is now the law in Utah. Thayer, ~,I 29-69. Thayer involved a certified 
question sent from the federal court to the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of whether 
school officials' allowance of guns loaded with blanks to be used in a school production, 
constituted "issuance [ of a] permit, license, .... or similar authorization" which would be 
immune conduct. Id. at ,I 2. The Utah Supreme Court answered that the conduct of 
school officials in allowing the guns to be present did not fall within the exception, and 
therefore the government was not immune from suit. Id. 
Justice Lee dissented in part, not because the final outcome was necessarily wrong, 
but because he felt there were issues of fact, such as superseding cause and comparative 
negligence, that needed to be resolved first "in the federal court." Id. at~ 66. He 
reasoned, "the question of immunity ... turns on questions that are not properly before us. 
7 
We should not short-circuit [the] end result ... " Id. at 168. In addition, Justice Lee 
distinguished two of the three cases cited by the District, stating: 
Taylor and Led/ors were easy cases involving uncontroversial fact-patterns 
in which there could be no question that the alleged acts of negligence did 
not supersede the causal connection to conduct for which the government 
was immune. In both cases, the immune acts came after the government's 
alleged negligence . . . In these circumstances, it is easy to the understand 
why the court so easily concluded that the assault and not the antecedent 
negligence was the legal cause of the injury 
Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist., 2012 UT 31,160,285 P.3d 1142 (emphasis added). 
In distinguishing the facts of Thayer, however, Justice Lee warned, "This case is not so 
easy .... there is a legitimate question." Id. at 162. Justice Lee's reasoning has now 
been adopted under Barneck. 
Here, similarly, the trial court should not be allowed to short-circuit the end result 
by making inappropriate assumptions and determinations of fact regarding the alleged 
superseding proximate cause of Larsen's harm. As with Thayer, and in contrast to the 
cases cited by the District where all parties stipulated that unwanted physical contact 
caused the plaintiffs' harm, in the present case there are questions of fact regarding the 
proximate cause of Larsen's harm. In addition, unlike the District's cited summary 
judgment cases, the court's ruling in this case was in response to a Rule 12(b )(6) pre-
discovery motion. Where Larsen did not plead there was any unwanted physical contact 
that proximately caused his injuries, the trial court cannot be allowed to assume such a 
fact to allow immunity. Instead of allowing the trial court's assumptions to govern the 
outcome of this case, the parties should be allowed to engage in discovery to determine 
the answer to the fundamental question-what was the proximate cause of Larsen's harm 
in this case? 
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C. The Provisions in the Criminal Code Cannot Be Used as a Basis for 
Dismissal of a Civil Case. 
As the District did in its original Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion, the District continues to 
rely on the criminal code in arguing that Altice committed civil assault and battery. The 
District argues that under the criminal code, Larsen lacked the ability to consent to sexual 
intercourse with Altice, and therefore, the sex meets the definition of "unwanted contact" 
or contact "to which no reasonable person would consent" ( a prerequisite for civil assault 
in Wagner v. State, ,r 51 ). Yet, as stated in Larsen's Brief, and completely unresponded to 
by the District, the criminal code is inapplicable, because it "does not bar, suspend, or 
otherwise affect any right . .. to damages ... to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, 
... regardless of whether the conduct involved in the proceeding constitutes an offense 
defined in this [ criminal] code." Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-1-107 (3) ( 197 3) ( emphasis 
added.)2 
While the criminal code defines by statute the circumstances under which a minor 
can be deemed to have consented or not consented to sexual intercourse for purposes of 
~ criminal charges and sentencing, the civil law does not contain any such bright line. 
Instead, in a case involving alleged assault and battery, a fact-finder must examine 
whether the contact was wanted or unwanted based on the facts of that case. 
Furthermore, even in relying on the inapplicable criminal code, the District makes 
incorrect assertions regarding the definition of consent. The District claims that "in the 
case of minors, society takes the ability to consent away until the child is an adult." 
(ii) (Appellee Brief 20.) In reality, even under the criminal code, 17-year-olds can consent to 
2 The District also claims, without any authority, that there is no tort of "sexual 
misconduct," ignoring that this exact tort was successfully pied and discussed in the 
factually similar Birkner v. Salt Lake Cty., 771 P .2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). 
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sex with an adult in many circumstances. See U.C.A. § 76-5-406(9) (stating that sex with 
a minor is without consent if the minor is "younger than 14 years of age"). The criminal 
code simply acknowledges that a teacher-student relationship can be unique, allowing 
Brianne Altice to be charged criminally. Yet charging Altice with a crime because she 
held a position of trust when she had sex with Larsen does not automatically mean that 
Larsen, the 17-year-old who agreed to have sex, was therefore civilly assaulted against his 
will. Despite the District's assertion that Larsen lacked the ability to consent to sex, the 
civil law requires that a jury examine the facts surrounding Larsen rather than relying on 
the criminal code to detennine what a "reasonable person" might do under the same 
circumstances. 
More importantly, even if it could be found that Larsen lacked the ability to want 
or consent to sexual intercourse with his teacher, Larsen's harm did not arise from sexual 
intercourse. As pled in Larsen's Complaint, the relationship between Larsen and Altice 
was a "romantic relationship" that included "flirtatious conversations with Plaintiff, ... 
[visits] during [Altice's] second period preparation class, texting, ... meeting Plaintiff on 
or near school grounds, [and] requesting assistance in her employment errands." (R. 2.) 
Although there were sexual encounters, there was no single sexual act that constituted the 
source of Larsen's harm. Rather, the cause of injury stems from months of emotional as 
well as sexual interaction between teacher and student, in addition to months of scorn and 
ridicule from friends and community. Larsen's harm is not easily defined by a single 
event of unwanted physical contact, as it was in the cases cited by the District. This 
complicated history requires that a jury be allowed to determine the proximate cause of 





Accordingly, a jury must be allowed to determine whether, on the whole, the 
touching between Altice and Larsen was "unwanted" by Larsen himself, and whether that 
touching was the proximate cause of his claimed harm. 
D. The GIA Bars Causes of Action For The Infliction of Mental Distress, Not 
Damages for Mental Distress. 
The District defends the trial court's error in treating a damages category as if it 
were a separate negligence action by, essentially, indicating the trial court's error was 
harmless. Yet again, the District is applying the incorrect legal standard. The standard of 
review on this issue requires the Utah Court of Appeals to review the trial court's 
decision for correctness. The District's allegation that any error was harmless fails to 
acknowledge this legal standard, and assumes a scenario with discovery and findings, 
rather than a 12(b )( 6) motion. 
Here, Larsen pied, as a damage, "mental distress." The GIA does not bar an entire 
claim simply because it pleads as a damage something that has similar wording to a tort. 
Larsen's claims should not have been dismissed on the basis that he included "mental 
distress" as a damage. 
CONCLUSION 
The District's brief largely ignores the arguments in Larsen's brief. First, the 
• District fails to address the key differences between a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion and a 
summary judgment motion, referencing only summary judgment cases. Second, the 
District relies on the criminal code to defeat Larsen's claims, in violation of the criminal 
• code's prohibitions against its use in civil cases. Third, and most importantly, the District 
fails to acknowledge the change in standard that came with the Barneck decision, with the 
District asserting that the standard is essentially unchanged. This assertion by the District 
allows it to ignore all public policy arguments, which can explain and support an 
11 
adjustment to how immunity under the GIA is analyzed. When the new standard is 
applied to the specific facts of this case, wherein the District hired a teacher with prior 
known sexual misconduct, then negligently retained that teacher and allowed her to 
engage in ongoing relationships to the detriment of students, the Barneck proximate cause 
standard results in no immunity to the District. Larsen requests this Court reverse the trial 
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